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Case No. 20100818-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SAUL CRISTOBAL, 
Def endant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault in concert 
with two or more persons, a second degree felony, :r \,,.;..nor. >•, 
Ann. t 7t-5- IlL M \ \ W 2I I'M), Ul.-ih Code An c . , > > : - r , . • -
tiii.l LMah Cod.-' -\nn. r W ? i n 1 (WVst Supp. •> • J ;; •  --->,> 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009). This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2010). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion under rule 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in admitting evidence of Defendant's gang affiliation where such 
evidence was directly probative of the elements of the charged crimes. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. "Whether evidence is admissible under rule 403 is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, If 34, 
250 P.3d 69. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 403 "will be 
overturned only if the trial court's 'determination... is beyond the limits of 
reasonability.'" State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168,116, P.3d (citation 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah R. Evid, 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West Supp. 2009) ("Criminal responsibility for 
direct commission of offense or for conduct of another") 
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009) ("Offenses committed in 
concert with two or more persons — Notice — Enhanced penalties") 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (Aggravated assault) 
Utah Code Ann, fi 76-9-101 (West Supp. 2009) (Riot) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1 
Defendant, codefendant Lonny High, and an unknown third man 
together attacked two brothers, Desidero and Emilio Maciel. Having 
encountered the brothers twice before on the Provo River Trail, the attackers 
waited until the third encounter to beat them with a club and grapefruit-
sized rock. 
"I want a cigarette." 
Desidero Maciel and his friend Dakota were traveling by longboard 
along the Provo River Trail at night. R. 171:177-78. Defendant, codefendant 
Lonny High, and an unknown third man ran to catch Dakota; Defendant 
grabbed Dakota, pulling him off his longboard. Id. at 178,180,181. The 
cohorts surrounded Dakota, and Defendant demanded a cigarette. Id. at 178, 
180. One of the men suggested leaving, but Defendant insisted: "No, I want a 
cigarette." Id. at 180. Dakota offered to roll a cigarette for Defendant, but 
discovered he had no rolling papers. Id. at 181. Desidero and Dakota then 
1
 Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, | 3, 243 P.2d 
1250. 
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left. Id. at 181. The encounter lasted approximately three to four minutes. Id. 
at 180. * 
"What you looking at?" 
Later that night, Desidero alone passed through the same area of the 
trail and again encountered the men who had previously accosted him and 
Dakota. Id. at 182. Desidero glanced at the group, and one of them (possibly 
Defendant) said in a threatening tone, "What you looking at?" Id. at 182-83. 
Desidero sped away on his long board. Id. at 183. 
i 
"There might be trouble/' 
Desidero called his brother Emilio Maciel, who was close by, and the 
brothers met to go home together. Id. at 130. Desidero told Emilio of his ' 
encounters with Defendant s band and said "There might be trouble." Id. at 
130. Desidero suggested returning home by a different route but, not 
sensing the danger, Emilio insisted on returning along the trail. Id. at 131, 
133,158. 
As Desidero had expected, Defendant and his cohorts began following 
the brothers along the trail. Id. at 133-34. The third man crossed paths with 
Emilio, saying "What up Vato?" Id. at 155. This man whistled, apparently as 
some sort of signal to the other two. Id. at 149,155. In response, Defendant 
and High approached the third man and the brothers. Id. at 149. Emilio 
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asked, "Why are you following us?" Id. at 134. Desidero stated, "You're the 
people that stopped me before." Id. When Defendant or one of his 
companions threatened, "You better take your home boy home," the brothers 
agreed to leave. Id. at 134,173,206. But as the brothers continued along the 
trail, and the three men continued to follow. Id. at 134. Emilio told the men, 
"Don't follow us." Id. Desidero then stated to Emilio that the group were 
"wannabe gangsters." Id. at 134; 188. 
Defendant then picked up a grapefruit-sized rock, and looked as if he 
were going to throw it at Desidero. Id at 135-36,159,185. But instead of 
throwing the rock, Defendant and the third man "rushed" Desidero. Id. at 
136,185. A "split second" later, High started throwing punches at Emilio. Id. 
at 136,160, 200. Emilio kneed and pushed High aside to run to his brothers 
aid. Id. at 140. 
As Defendant and the third man attacked Desidero, Desidero quickly 
fell to the ground and did not fight back. Id. at 187,188. The third man beat 
Desidero a stick or club. Id. at 162,186-87. Defendant hit Desidero in the 
head with the rock. Id. at 162,185-86,199. Defendant and the third man 
repeatedly beat Desidero with the stick and rock. Id. at 186. 
After Emilio broke free from High, he pulled the third man off 
Desidero. Id. at 140. Desidero escaped from Defendant and picked up his 
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longboard to use for self-defense. Id. at 187. The third man hit Emilio in the 
head with the stick. Id. at 140. The three men then fled. Id. at 143,200. As 
they fled, the men flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL." Id. at 143. Both 
brothers suffered head injuries. Id. at 144-46,186. 
Defendant and High each testified that they participated in the fight in 
self-defense. See generally R. 172:275-340. 
"It's just a gang." 
PVL is a street gang, whose name means " Provo Varrios Locotes," or 
as translated by High, "Provo Neighborhood Crazies." Id. at 304,305. Both 
Defendant and High admitted having been members of PVL. Id. at 299, 317. 
They both claimed, however, that Defendant had cancelled his membership 
in the gang two or three months before the assault. Id. at 299, 304, 317. High 
claimed that Defendant did not "want to be affiliated with us. He didn't 
want no involvement in none of our activities." Id. at 305. 
Over Defendant's objections, the trial court allowed Defendant and 
High to be questioned about the nature of PVL. See, e.g., id. at 305-06. High 
testified that PVL is "just a gang;" that PVL exists to do "graffiti and stuff;" 
that PVL has territorial boundaries in Provo; that PVL has "conflicts with 
rival gangs," meaning "fights;" and that "fighting and stuff" and a tendency 
to bravery and aggression raises one's status within the gang. Id. at 306-07. 
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The criminal case. 
Defendant and High were charged with two counts of aggravated 
assault in concert with two or more persons, each second degree felonies; 
riot, a third degree felony; and obstructing justice, a class A misdemeanor. 
R.l-2. Defendant and High were tried together. During trial, the State filed 
an amended information eliminating the obstruction charge. R. 97-98. The 
State then moved to strike one count of aggravated assault, to conform with 
the evidence presented. R. 172:354. The jury convicted Defendant and High 
of the two remaining charges/aggravated assault in concert with two or more 
persons and riot. R. 164. Defendant timely appealed. R. 169. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the trial court's discretionary ruling admitting 
evidence of his gang membership and the basic nature of the PVL gang. He 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because its probative value was 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. 
Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. Rule 403 allows, but 
generally does not require, trial courts to exclude evidence if the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Because the 
High also appealed. See case number 20100668-CA. 
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challenged evidence here has high probative value and a low risk of unfair 
prejudice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ( 
The admitted gang evidence was highly probative for three reasons: 
first, it was relevant to whether Defendant committed an assault in concert 
with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; second, it 
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his possible motives 
for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in understanding the 
circumstances of the attack. 
The gang evidence bore little risk of unfair prejudice because it did not 
prompt the jury to decide on an improper basis, such as hatred or horror. 
Rather, the evidence allowed the jury to decide the case only upon the facts 
of the crimes themselves. A trial court's balancing of evidence's 
probativeness against its danger of unfair prejudice is highly fact dependent 
and discretionary, and Defendant has not demonstrated an abuse of that 
discretion. 
But even if the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting the 
gang evidence, any error was harmjiess. Reversal is warranted only if, absent 
the evidence, there is a substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 
Other record evidence, unchallenged on appeal, would have signaled 
Defendant's gang involvement to the jury, and the jury had sufficient other 
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evidence of Defendant's guilt. Thus, Defendant has not shown that without 
the challenged evidence the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt. 
Without such a showing, any error in the trial court's evidentiary ruling is 
harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
ADMITTING THE GANG EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT IS 
DIRECTLY RELEVANT AND ITS PROBATIVE VALUE FAR 
OUTWEIGHS ANY DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE. 
Defendant brings only one claim on appeal, arguing that the trial court 
abused its' discretion by admitting evidence of his gang affiliation and the 
nature of PVL itself. See Br. Aplt. at 7. Defendant argues that the gang 
evidence runs afoul of rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, in that the 
" probative value of the gang-related testimony is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice/' Id. The trial court acted well within its 
discretion to admit the evidence because the evidence was directly relevant 
to the charges at issue, explained the circumstances and motive for the crime, 
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense, and did not urge the jury to 
convict on some improper ground other than the guilt of the accused. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that "[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible/7 Utah R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any 
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tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be < 
without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. However, relevant "evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. 
Evid. 403 (emphasis added). 
Under rule 403, the court "indulge[s] a presumption in favor of 
admissibility." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1222 (Utah 1993). "Rule 403 
does not require a trial court to dismiss all prejudicial evidence because all 
effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being damaging to the party 
against whom it is offered." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, | 53,191 P.3d 17 
(quotations, citation and alteration omitted). "Rather, the rule only requires 
that the trial court measure the danger the evidence poses of causing 'unfair 
prejudice' to a defendant." Id. "'Unfair prejudice' within [the context of rule 
403] means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis 
. . . . " State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1989). 
A. The gang evidence is highly probative of the issues before the 
jury. 
In context of the issues before the jury, the gang evidence Defendant 
challenges was directly and highly relevant. Indeed, Defendant himself 
concedes that the evidence was relevant; he argues only that it was "slightly 
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probative/7 See Br. Aplt. at 10. To the contrary, the gang evidence was highly 
probative in assisting the jury in arriving at a decision upon a proper basis. 
Thus, the evidence's probativeness far outweighed any danger of unfair 
prejudice. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of evidence of 
accused's membership in gang, 39 A.L.R. 4th 775 (1985) (citing cases dealing 
with admissibility of gang evidence, and concluding that "[g]ang 
membership has frequently been found to be probative and admissible"). 
The gang evidence in this case had direct relevance to the issues at trial 
for three reasons: first, it was relevant to prove Defendant acted in concert 
with two or more persons, an element of the charged offense; second, it 
rebutted Defendant's claim of self-defense by explaining his possible motives 
for initiating the attack; and third, it aided the jury in understanding the 
circumstances of the attack. 
1. The gang evidence was relevant to show Defendant acted 
in concert with two or more persons. 
First, Defendant was charged with committing aggravated assault in 
concert with two or more persons in violation of Utah Code sections 76-5-103 
(aggravated assault) and 76-3-203.1 (providing enhanced penalties for 
committing assault in concert with two or more persons). Section -203.1 
provides: 
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i 
(l)(a) A person who commits [aggravated assault] is subject to an 
enhanced penalty for the offense . . . if the trier of fact finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person acted in concert with two or more * 
persons. 
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means 
the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons 
in committing the offense and was aware that he was so aided or 
encouraged, and each of the other persons: 
(i) was physically present; or 
(ii) participated as a party . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West Supp. 2009). 
i 
Section 203.l(l)(a) requires that the factfinder — in this case, the jury — 
determine whether Defendant acted in concert with two or more persons. 
And section 203.1 (l)(b) requires the jury to make determinations regarding a 
defendant's awareness of the others aiding him. Thus, the gang evidence at 
issue here directly addresses the findings the jury was required to make 
under the enhancement provisions of section 203.1. See also United States v. 
Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996,1007 (7th Or. 1997) ("Evidence of gang affiliation is 
admissible [under rule 403] in cases in which it is relevant to demonstrate the 
existence of a joint venture or conspiracy and a relationship among its 
members."). 
Defendant and his cohorts belonged to PVL, a street gang whose 
purposes included street fighting, and whose members rewarded bravery 
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and aggressive behavior. Further, this specific gang had on other occasions 
engaged in fighting rivals. This evidence makes it more likely that Defendant 
committed this assault in concert with other members of his gang, and that 
he was aware that they all had the same purposes in fighting. Thus, the 
evidence Defendant complains of is directly and highly probative of the 
crimes he was charged with and the specific findings the jury had to render. 
2. The gang evidence was relevant to rebut Defendant's claim 
of self-defense. 
Second, Defendant raised a claim of self-defense at trial, alleging that 
the Maciel brothers started the fight. See, e.g., R. 172:321. The parties 
presented mutually exclusive versions of how the fight began, and the jury 
was aided in deciding between those versions by knowing that Defendant 
and his compatriots belonged to a street gang that rewarded aggression and 
fighting. The gang evidence thus speaks to Defendant's motives in fighting: 
(1) he would be rewarded by status and approval from his friends by 
fighting; and (2) Desidero had insulted the gang members by calling them 
"wannabe gangsters/' giving them a reason to retaliate.3 Having a gang-
5
 Defendant does not argue that the gang evidence constitutes 
improper character evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, nor 
could he. The gang evidence is not evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or 
acts/' Utah R. Evid. 404(b). In any event, motive is a proper non-character 
purpose that would render such evidence admissible, even if it otherwise 
constituted evidence of character. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b). 
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i 
related motive to fight makes it less likely that Defendant merely responded 
to the aggression of others, and more likely that he initiated the fight. Thus, < 
Defendant's own claim of self-defense rendered his gang membership 
directly relevant and highly probative.
 { 
3. The gang evidence was relevant to explain the 
circumstances of the fight. 
Finally, the gang evidence was relevant because the circumstance of i 
the fight itself suggested gang activity, and the jury was entitled to know 
who and what PVL is. The fight began after Desidero called Defendant and 
•i 
his cohorts "wannabe gangsters/' and ended with the men flashing gang 
signs and shouting their gang name as they fled the scene.4 The companions 
themselves linked their gang membership directly to the fight and wanted 
their gang status to be known. 
The parties could not have provided the jury a full and fair description 
of events without reference to PVL, and the evidence would have been 
confusing to the jury without at least a basic understanding of what PVL is. 
Rule 403 "does not shield defendants who engage in 'outrageous acts' or 
require the prosecution to 'sanitize its case/" nor does rule 403 "permit 'only 
the crimes of Caspar Milquetoasts to be described fully.'" 1 Christopher B. 
4
 Defendant does not challenge the testimony that he and his 
companions flashed gang signs and shouted "PVL" as they fled. 
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Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:13 (3rd ed. 2007) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Rule 403 allows the trial court to exclude evidence when such evidence 
would lead to "confusion of the issues, or mislead[] the jury/' The contested 
evidence in this case, however, has the opposite effect because its absence 
would have led to confusion and would have mislead the jury. See State v. 
Downs, 2008 UT App 247,114,190 P.3d 17 (evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial where it provides context and bears on defendant's credibility); 
see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 24,25 P.3d 985 (admission of evidence of 
nicknames, chants, and dances provided background for the charged crime 
and was therefore properly admitted); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1141 
(Utah 1989) (evidence is admissible where it is relevant to "explain the 
circumstances surrounding the instant crime"); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 
882 (Utah 1978) (where "evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose"). 
The gang evidence in this case served multiple permissible purposes, 
and did so with force and probity. It aided the jury in determining the 
central and proper issues they had to consider, and the trial court thus acted 
well within its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible 
under rule 403. 
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B. The gang evidence posed little danger of unfair prejudice. 
As stated trial court acts within its discretion to exclude otherwise < 
relevant evidence only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice/' Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Again, 
"'[ujnfair prejudice' within [the context of rule 403] means an undue 
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis . . . . " Maurer, 770 P.2d at 
984. An improper basis is commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, 
"such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution or horror." State v. 
Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, f 21,196 P.3d 124 (citation and quotations omitted), 
cert denied, 207 P.3d 432 (2009). "Only when evidence poses a danger of 
'rous[ing] the jury to overmastering hostility' does it reach the level of unfair 
prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent." Killpack, 2008 UT 49 at 1 53 
(quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, | 29, 8 P.3d 1025). Stated another way, 
unfair "prejudicial evidence is any evidence that affects the trier of fact in a 
manner not attributable to the permissible probative force of the evidence." 1 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of 
Evidence Manual 243 (7th ed. 1998). "[T]he term 'unfair' emphasizes the point 
that evidence ought not to be excluded at the mere hint of risk . . . . " Mueller 
et al, supra, § 4:13. 
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Defendant has cited no authority for the proposition that evidence of 
gang membership that directly explains the crime at issue will necessarily 
cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Defendant has cited 
State v. Smith, S.W. 3d , 2011 WL1233367 (Tex. App.). See Br. Aplt. at 
10,15. But in that case, the Texas Court of Appeals determined that rule 403 
prohibited introduction of evidence of gang membership because such 
membership had "little probative value under the facts of this case." Id. at 
*14-15. Gang membership in that case had nothing to do with the murder at 
issue. See id. at *14. In other words, Smith was decided more as a matter of 
relevance than as a matter of unfair prejudice. Smith is thus inapposite here 
because Defendant's gang membership is directly relevant to the elements of 
the charged crimes, provides Defendant's motive, and rebuts his claim of 
self-defense. 
. Defendant also cites State v. MMigan, 2010 UT App 152,2010 WL 
2311852, for the proposition that "there may be some unfair prejudice 
inherent in making the jury aware of gang affiliation/7 See Br. Aplt. at 8 
(citing id. at *2). But in that case, this Court affirmed admission of the gang 
evidence under rule 403 because the evidence was "highfly] probative" and 
not "emphasized by the prosecutor" for irrelevant purposes. Milligan, 2010 
UT App 152,2010 WL 2311852, at *2. The gang evidence in this case was 
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likewise highly probative and not overly emphasized by the prosecutor other 
than to show context. The challenged testimony is limited to fewer than three < 
pages of transcript within the context of a two-day trial with over 400 pages 
of transcript. See R. 172:306-08. Moreover, the prosecutor did not initiate the
 ( 
challenged line of questioning until after Defendant and codefendant Lonny 
High raised their claim of self-defense. See id. In fact, the prosecutor did not 
refer at all to Defendant's gang membership during his summation. See R. 
172:371-77. Further, the trial court issued a limiting instruction regarding the 
proper use of the gang evidence. See R. 132. The State thus confined its 
exploration of Defendant's gang membership to its proper and legitimate 
purposes and did not use the gang evidence to predispose the jury against 
Defendant in any improper way. 
Thus, under the cases Defendant cites, evidence of gang membership is 
admissible under rule 403 if it bears directly on the facts and circumstances of 
the crimes at issue. Where evidence of gang membership does not bear on 
the issues of a particular case, such evidence may certainly cause unfair 
prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 587 F.3d 861, 867 
(7th Cir. 2009) ("Evidence of gang membership can be inflammatory, with the 
danger being that it leads the jury to attach a propensity for committing 
crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs or that a jury's negative 
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feelings toward gangs will influence its verdict....") (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 
1996) ("We have consistently held that, under appropriate circumstances, 
gang evidence has probative value warranting its admission over claims of 
prejudice. However, we have also long recognized the substantial risk of 
unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence . . . .") (citations 
omitted). Such is not the case here, and Defendant has not shown that the 
challenged evidence prompted the jury to convict him for any reason other 
than his guilt for the charged crimes. 
But even if Defendant had shown that the gang evidence had limited 
probative value and a significant risk of unfair prejudice, he has not shown 
that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by that risk. See Utah R. Evid. 403. 
The requisite balancing test necessarily rests within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an 
abuse of that discretion. See State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, f 18, 222 
P.3d 768; State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, \ 12, 95 P.3d 302. "We are 
confident that Trial Judges can identify the likely harm associated with 
probative evidence and can estimate its impact on the jury." Saltzburg et al, 
supra, at 242. "Because Rule 403 provides that the negative factors set forth in 
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the Rule must substantially outweigh the probative value, it follows that the 
discretionary power to exclude should rarely be used." Id. at 259. Accord K-B < 
Trucking Co. v. Riss InVl Coiy., 763 F.2d 1148,1155 (10th Cir. 1985) ("The 
exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to
 { 
be used sparingly.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Because there is little danger of unfair prejudice to Defendant, and that 
risk does not substantially outweigh the high probative value of the gang 
evidence, Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion 
by admitting the challenged evidence. 
II. 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, 
ADMISSION OF THE GANG EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS 
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged 
gang evidence, that ruling was nevertheless harmless error. An error is 
harmless where there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 1989); see 
also Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Stated 
otherwise, "[f]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict/' 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987). 
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Defendant complains only of the evidence of Defendant's past gang 
affiliation and the prosecutor's introduction of evidence regarding the nature 
of PVL. See Br. Aplt. at 1,12-13. Had the trial court excluded all the 
challenged evidence, however, the jury would have nevertheless heard 
testimony that Defendant responded to the third man's whistle, that the three 
cohorts attacked the Maciel brothers unprovoked, that Decidero considered 
Defendant and his friends to be "wannabe gangsters," and that Defendant 
and his friends flashed gang signs and shouted the name of a gang as they 
fled the scene of the crime. Thus, the challenged evidence was merely 
cumulative of other, unchallenged evidence of concerted gang activity by 
Defendant and his friends. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989) 
(finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative 
of other testimony). 
CONCI USION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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